Diversity and neighbourhood satisfaction by Langella, Monica & Manning, Alan
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1459 
December 2016 
Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction 
Monica Langella 
Alan Manning 
    
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of ethnic diversity on individuals’ overall satisfaction with 
and other aspects of their neighbourhood. It uses panel data and a variety of empirical 
methods to control for potential endogeneity of diversity and of the location choices. We find 
that a higher white share in the neighbourhood raises overall satisfaction with the 
neighbourhood in our (overwhelming white) sample, but has no significant impact on 
generalised trust or other commonly-used measures of social capital. We suggest that part of 
the impact of diversity on overall neighbourhood satisfaction may be through an effect on a 
fear of crime and the quality of social life. 
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Introduction 
Sizeable parts of the population of most Western countries seem troubled by increased ethnic 
diversity in their societies. For many people, the most direct impact of these changes is felt in 
their communities and this paper is about how ethnic diversity within neighbourhoods affects 
a variety of measures of people’s satisfaction with their local areas. We consider the impact on 
overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood, the intention to move, actual residential mobility, 
trust in others, activity in organizations (these two being commonly used measures of ‘social 
capital’ e.g. Putnam, 2000), perceptions of crime, the quality of social life and local services. 
There is a large and growing literature on related issues. Some have argued that greater 
diversity erodes trust (Putnam, 2007; Dinesen and Sonderskov, 2012), lowers involvement in 
organizations (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003), lowers the level of 
social cohesion (see the survey by Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014), lowers the level of public 
good provision (see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; the review by Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005), lowers the quality of government (Alesina and Zhuravskhaya, 2011) or changes 
attitudes to redistribution (Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundquvist, 2012).  
The studies cited above have been controversial and subject to a number of criticisms (see 
Portes and Vickstrom, 2011, for an overview). First, there is the possibility that the observed 
correlations of diversity and trust are caused by confounding factors - which might be at 
individual or neighbourhood level. For example, the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) 
evaluations (Kling, Liebmann and Katz, 2007, Ludwig et al , 2012, and Chetty, Hendren and 
Katz, 2016) have found important effects of neighbourhood poverty on subjective well-being, 
mental health and long-term child outcomes and Laurence and Heath (2008) argue that 
deprivation is an important confounder in the UK. In addition, Uslaner, (2012) argues that it is 
segregation rather than diversity that is important, while Tesei (2014) points to the importance 
of racial income inequality.  
Secondly, most studies in this area rely on correlations in cross-sectional data in which 
causality is not clearly proved (Portes and Vickstrom, 2011), although there are some 
exceptions. For example, Algan, Hemet and Laitin (2016) exploit the random assignment of 
tenants to apartment blocks in France to investigate the impact of ethnic diversity on social 
relationships and housing quality. In the US, the MTO experiment (Kling, Liebmann and Katz, 
2007, Ludwig et al , 2012, and Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016) exploits the random provision 
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of housing vouchers to encourage low-income families to more to lower-poverty 
neighbourhoods. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to this literature. Using longitudinal data for the 
period 1991-2014 from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 1  and its successor 
Understanding Society (UKHLS)2, we investigate the impact of ethnic diversity on a wider 
range of measures of neighbourhood satisfaction than is common in most of the existing 
literature. The UK is an interesting country to study these issues as the last 25 years have seen 
substantial change in the structure of the population, which means that many neighbourhoods 
have undergone quite sizeable changes. The fraction of the population that is non-white has 
risen from 5% in the 1991 census to 15.5% in the 2011 census.  
The main outcome that we consider is overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood, but we also 
consider generalised trust, activity in organizations, fear of crime, satisfaction with social life 
and the quality of local services. We focus on ethnic diversity as our variable of interest, but 
we also control for a variety of other neighbourhood characteristics. In particular we pay close 
attention to controlling for neighbourhood deprivation as the relative impact of diversity and 
deprivations has been the focus of intense discussion in the UK (Laurence and Heath, 2008; 
Letki, 2008; Andrews, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Twigg, Taylor and Mohan, 2010; 
Laurence, 2011; Becares et al, 2011; Sturgis et al, 2011; Demireva and Heath, 2014). 
The paper also makes a contribution in taking seriously the problems of establishing causality 
from diversity to neighbourhood satisfaction. First, the use of longitudinal data allows us to 
control for individual and neighbourhood fixed effects. Second, we instrument for diversity 
using a ‘Bartik-style’ instrument (Bartik, 1991). Third, we develop an empirical approach to 
control for the possible selection bias caused by the endogeneity of residential choice. We hope 
that in addressing these empirical issues, we make some progress in providing causal estimates 
of the impact of diversity. Throughout, we report a wide variety of specifications (including 
some very demanding ones) in order to convey the robustness (or lack of it) of our empirical 
findings.  
1 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2014). British Household Panel Survey, Waves 1-18, 1991-2009: Special 
Licence Access, Lower Layer Super Output Areas and Scottish Data Zones. [data collection]. 3rd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6136, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6136-2 
2 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. (2016). Understanding Society: 
Waves 1-6, 2009-2015: Special Licence Access, Census 2001 Lower Layer Super Output Areas. [data collection]. 7th Edition. UK Data Service. 
SN: 6670, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6670-7 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the individual data that we 
use, and introduce the outcome measures we study. The third section presents the 
neighbourhood data used. We discuss how one might measure the diversity of neighbourhoods 
arguing that it is difficult to disentangle the many possible measures because of a high degree 
of collinearity between them. In the end, our main estimates use the white share of the 
population in the neighbourhood as our measure of diversity, though an Appendix presents 
estimates with alternative measures and the qualitative conclusions are very similar. The fourth 
section describes our empirical methodology detailing in particular the way in which we control 
for the endogeneity of neighbourhood characteristics for individuals that is the result of 
residential choice. In this section we also discuss the instruments we use for the diversity 
measure. 
The fifth section reports our basic results for satisfaction with the neighbourhood (Letki, 2008, 
also uses a similar measure as part of her composite ‘neighbourhood attitude’ variable). In most 
of our specifications we find that neighbourhood satisfaction among our sample (which is 
overwhelmingly white) is significantly positively related to the white share of the population, 
and that our result is robust to alternative estimation methods. The sixth section presents 
evidence that neighbourhood satisfaction does predict intention to move and actual residential 
moves, hopefully allaying fears that responses to a subjective neighbourhood satisfaction 
question are unreliable. The seventh section considers outcomes that have often been studied 
in the social capital literature (trust, and activity in organizations) – we find no significant, 
robust, relationship with diversity. The eighth section considers satisfaction with particular 
aspects of the neighbourhood - perceptions of crime, and quality of local services and social 
life. On perceptions of crime, we generally find negative effects of the white share. Results on 
the quality of services and of social life are more mixed though there is some evidence that a 
higher white share is associated with a higher quality of social life. The ninth section attempts 
to provide an account of the transmission mechanism from neighbourhood characteristics to 
overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood. These estimates cannot be thought of as causal but 
we argue that they are interesting. We show that neighbourhood satisfaction does appear to be 
significantly related to perceptions of crime, the perceived quality of local services and social 
life and the level of social capital. So all of these channels may play an important role in 
explaining how diversity affects neighbourhood satisfaction. 
Our main conclusions are that diversity seems to influence neighbourhood satisfaction and that 
fear of crime may be an important channel for this. 
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2. Individual Data
This study uses information from two longitudinal British surveys, the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and its successor, Understanding Society (UKHLS)3. They follow the 
same representative sample of households over time, interviewing all individuals aged 16 or 
above4. BHPS started in 1991 and lasted for 18 waves, finishing in 2008. The first wave 
included around 10,300 individuals from 5,500 households in Great Britain5. UKHLS started 
in 2009, and is still ongoing. The first wave surveyed individuals from approximately 40,000 
households. Since 2010, UKHLS also includes the whole BHPS panel6 that, at the time, 
surveyed individuals from about 8,000 households. Together, they allow construction of a 
panel that covers more than 20 years. They include a wide variety of detailed questions on 
perceptions and attitudes towards the neighbourhood where people live. Unfortunately, not all 
questions appear in each year and there is no year in which all questions of potential interest 
appear7 – this has implications for our empirical enquiry that we discuss below. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics on the variables, grouped into broad categories. First, there is 
our main question of interest – overall, whether you like your present neighbourhood – 92.6% 
of people do. We also consider the fraction who plan to stay in their current neighbourhood 
(69%) and the actual mobility from one year to the next (6.7%). The next panel of Table 1 
considers some measures of social capital – generalized trust, whether active in or member of 
at least one organization and whether one is willing to improve one’s neighbourhood. The 
third panel of Table 1 presents measures relating to the perception of crime, both an overall 
worry about being a victim of crime (47.8% of people are) as well as fears about specific types 
of crime. As a summary index of fear of crime we use the overall “worry” question as this has 
the largest sample size having been a question in more waves of the survey. The fourth panel 
of Table 1 summarizes responses to questions about the quality of local services – schools, 
medical, transport, shopping and leisure. The final panel of Table 1 summarizes measures 
relating to the quality of social life – interactions and friendships with neighbours etc. We also 
3 These studies have a similar sample structure to the PSID in the US, though ask a wider range of questions on social attitudes. 
4 Since 1994, BHPS includes a short module for individuals aged 11-15. 
5 Following the first wave sampling, new entrants in the sample are mainly represented by people reaching the minimum age for the interview 
and people joining the original households. Additional samples of households from Scotland and Wales were included in 1999, and for 
Northern Ireland in 2001. 
6 The attrition rate for the BHPS panel between 2008 and 2010 was of 20%. 
7 Table B1 in the Appendix lists the relevant questions and the waves in which they appear.  
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combine measures of social capital, quality of local services, and quality of life in separate 
indices that are constructed using the first principal component of each group of variables. 
Principal component analysis results are reported in Table B2 of the Appendix. 
Although they are not the focus of interest we also include individual-level controls as 
regressors in most of our specifications – these are summarized in Table 2. The individual-
level controls comprise information on age, working status, housing status, education level, 
gender, marital status, number of children, and a dummy variable for being non-white.  
3. Neighbourhood level data
The geo-coded versions of the BHPS and UKHLS also contain detailed information on the 
residence of the respondents in each wave, specifically the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) 
level8 that will be our main geographical reference. There are 40,880 LSOAs in Britain9, 
containing on average 1,416 people10. The sample size of BHPS/UKHLS is too small to be 
able to compute reliable neighbourhood characteristics at this spatial scale so we use other 
data sources to measure them, mostly the decennial censuses, 1991-2011 inclusive.  
Measuring Diversity 
The main variable of interest in our study is ethnic diversity. The number of ethnic groups 
categorized varies across censuses and in our analysis we use nine groups that can be defined 
on a consistent basis - White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Black Caribbean, Black 
African, other Asian, other Black, and a residual category grouping together all other 
ethnicities. We impute values for the inter-censual years using linear interpolation for each 
area. We use information from 1991 and 1971 censuses to construct two instrumental variables 
for the ethnic mix, respectively, as explained in the following section. 
The existing literature uses a variety of measures to summarize the ethnic mix of an area. One 
popular measure is the fractionalization index (see e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), that is 
defined as: 
8 LSOAs were created from 2001 census of population to improve the reporting of small area statistics, they were then revised 
according to 2011 census. Both BHPS and UKHLS contain information at the 2001 LSOA level. In 2001, LSOAs in England and 
Wales were constructed to have a minimum of 1,000 inhabitants, and 400 households, and a maximum of 3,000 inhabitants, and 
1,200 households. Scotland designed statistical areas following the same criteria. Where other area codes were available, information 
was harmonised using Postcodes Directories (EDINA, University of Edinburgh) and Postcode Headcounts (Office for National 
Statistics).  
9 32,476 of which are in England, 6,502 in Scotland, and 1,896 in Wales. Northern Ireland is excluded from this analysis. 
10 This datum refers to the 1991 Census of Population. 
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21a iaiFRAC s  (1) 
where ias  is the share of ethnic (or country-of-birth) group i  in the population area 𝑎. This can
be interpreted as the chance that two randomly chosen people in the area belong to different 
groups11. But the fractionalization index is simply one of many possible ways in which the 
ethnic mix of a neighbourhood might affect outcomes. It might be that it is only the share of 
one’s own ethnic groups that is important or it might be the shares of particular ethnic groups. 
Or it might also be that it is the immigrant share rather than the ethnic group that is important. 
Historically most minorities were migrants and most migrants were minorities. But this 
correlation has weakened over time – many minorities are now UK–born and there has been 
substantial white immigration into the UK following the accession of the Eastern European 
A8 countries into the EU in 2004. 
In principle one can distinguish between these different hypotheses by conducting a ‘horse 
race’, testing one measure against another and seeing which has the greatest explanatory power. 
In practice we do not have enough power in the data to resolve this question beyond reasonable 
doubt as there is a high degree of collinearity between diversity measures as shown in Table 
412. For instance, the correlation between the white share and the ethnic fractionalization index 
is -0.96 because there are only a small number of neighbourhoods where the minority share is 
very high13 . The practical implication is that one cannot distinguish clearly between the 
hypothesis that it is the white share that is the relevant neighbourhood characteristic or the 
fractionalization index. This is in spite of the fact that these have different implications e.g. a 
linear effect of the white share implies a monotonic relationship between the white share and 
outcomes while the fractionalization index does not – however the values of the white share 
where they are different is sparse in our data.  
After some experimentation we decided to use the white share as the diversity measure in our 
main specification as this can be considered a parsimonious model for diversity that seems to 
work best for most specifications (see Becares et al, 2011, for another study that uses ethnic 
group shares as the diversity measure). But we recognize that others might prefer other 
11 An alternative interpretation is that individuals put a positive weight on their own-group share so that the ‘treatment’ effect varies across 
ethnic groups within their neighbourhood and the fractionalization index is then the average treatment effect across neighbourhoods.  
12 Information on the country of birth is also available for 1991-2011 censuses but the country of birth classification changes quite 
extensively across censuses. To estimate the migrant mix we use 4 groups that are consistently available throughout all censuses – United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Europe, and Other countries. 
13 Less than 1% of the LSOAs has a proportion of white people that is lower than 50% of whites in 1991, and, even though the migration 
influx has been quite pervasive over time, only 5% of areas had less than 50% of white residents in 2011. 
8 
variables and the Appendix includes a variety of alternative specifications – including the 
fractionalization index, the shares of people in the other ethnic groups as additional variables, 
as well as the share of migrants and the share of Muslims. 
One other issue that we do not explore is the difference between fractionalization and 
segregation (e.g. see Uslaner, 2012; Alesina and Zhuravskhaya, 2011). In this literature 
fractionalization (or some other measure of diversity) is typically measured at one level of 
spatial aggregation and the segregation is then the measure at a lower level of spatial 
aggregation. We choose to measure everything at as local a level as possible, although we 
provide some comparison with the effect of diversity calculated at different local aggregation 
level in the Appendix. 
Other Neighbourhood Characteristics 
Even though our main interest is in the measures of diversity described above, our 
specifications include time varying controls for deprivation, which is likely to be another factor 
influencing satisfaction and which has received a lot of attention in the UK literature (e.g. 
Demireva and Heath, 2014). For economic deprivation we use two measures. The first is the 
‘claimant count’ (an administrative measure of the numbers claiming Job Seekers Allowance, 
the UK’s unemployment-related benefit) normalized by the working age population so this 
can be interpreted as a measure of the unemployment rate and we refer to it as such. The 
claimant count is available at the LSOA level on an annual basis through NOMIS14. We 
include this as a control variable in all our specifications.  
Our second measure is the UK government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) that 
combines a range of indicators of disadvantage including the claimant count. This is the 
measure of deprivation most commonly used in the existing literature for the UK (e.g. 
Demireva and Heath, 2014). The IMD is available at five-yearly intervals so has to be 
interpolated for intervening years. There is the concern that some of the indicators in the IMD 
might be considered as potential outcomes, and the IMD varies in the way it is constructed 
across UK countries. However, our results are robust to whether we include or exclude the 
IMD. 
14 This corresponded to the count of the number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) from 1996 until 2012. With the 
introduction of the Universal Credit system in 2013, means tested elements of JSA have been replaced by this new system (Nomis, Official 
Labour Market Statistics). 
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In specifications that do not include neighbourhood fixed effects we control for some other 
time-fixed area characteristics, namely the baseline country of birth mix15, the 1991 industrial 
composition, population density in 1991, a dummy for the urbanisation of the area in 1991, 
the percentage of people aged less than 16 and more than 65 in 1991, the percentage of house 
owner households in 1991, and the percentage of households living in social houses in the 
same year16. This is important as some studies (e.g. Sturgis et al, 2011) have argued that the 
estimated impacts of diversity are sensitive to the other neighbourhood controls that are 
included. 
We now turn to the empirical specification we use. 
4. Empirical Specification
We are interested in how neighbourhood characteristics, which we will call amenities (though 
they might be disamenities) affect an outcome variable, y . Suppose we can model the outcome 
variable for individual 𝑖 in neighbourhood 𝑛 in period 𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡, as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽
𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐  are individual and neighbourhood characteristics, while 𝑎𝑛𝑡 represents the
neighbourhood amenities of interest, namely diversity, and 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 residuals that might have both 
a neighbourhood and an individual component. 
There is a number of issues associated with the estimation of (2). First it might be that even if 
people were randomly assigned to their neighbourhoods (which they are not), amenities of 
interest are correlated with unobserved individual or neighbourhood characteristics so that the 
errors in (2), 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡, are not independent of the amenities of interest 𝑎𝑛𝑡 and OLS estimation of 
(2) would lead to bias. One strategy for dealing with this issue is to control for a wide range of 
individual and neighbourhood characteristics and the longitudinal data we use is helpful in that 
regard as we can include individual and/or area fixed effects. But, our main strategy for dealing 
with this problem is to instrument for the amenities of interest (the precise instrument is 
15 Constructed upon 5 country of birth groups: United Kingdom and Europe, Africa, India, Pakistan, and Other countries, data from 1971 
Census of population. 
16 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for those control variables. 
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described later) i.e. to assume there is a set of instrumental variables 𝑧𝑛𝑡 independent of 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 
but correlated with 𝑎𝑛𝑡. The first-stage of this instrumental variable approach will then be:  
𝑎𝑛𝑡 =  𝜋
𝑛𝑧𝑛𝑡 + 𝜋
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≡ ?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑡  (3) 
Sample Selection 
Even if one assumes that the errors in (2) - 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 - are independent of 𝑎𝑛𝑡, each individual is 
only observed in one neighbourhood in each period. The observed neighbourhood (and hence 
the observed amenities) is therefore likely to be correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 as individuals are more 
likely to be found in neighbourhoods with amenities that they prefer. In other words, the 
neighbourhood in which we observe people is the result of a choice. We do have evidence that 
people do respond in this way – e.g. ‘white flight’, the process by which some US 
neighbourhoods and cities rapidly became majority black (Card, Mas and Rothstein, 2008; 
Boustan, 2010, 2012, for the US and Kaufmann and Harris, 2015, for the UK). A less dramatic 
example would be the literature on how immigration into an area affects the migration 
decisions of natives (Borjas, 1987, 1994; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996; Card and di Nardo, 
2000; Card, 1990, 2001, 2005; Saiz and Wachter, 2011; Amior, 2015). 
To demonstrate how we deal with the endogeneity of neighbourhood choice, substitute (3) into 
(2) to have:  
𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽
𝑛?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑛𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡  (4) 
Now augment this by a neighbourhood selection rule. Assume that neighbourhood choice is 
based on the maximization of some objective function, 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡 which is given by:  
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛾
𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑐 + 𝜈𝑖𝑛𝑡 (5) 
Where the residuals may be correlated with (𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡) but are assumed independent of the 
amenity instruments 𝑧1𝑛𝑡. Substituting (3) into (5) leads to:  
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛾
𝑛?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛾𝑛𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑛𝑡 (6) 
To make progress we assume - following, Das, Newey and Vella (2003) - that the expectation 
of the error in (4) can be written as a function of the propensity scores, 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡, the probability of 
individual 𝑖 choosing neighbourhood 𝑛, conditional on the covariates, and the neighbourhood 
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being chosen. In the non-binary case, this will generally be the probabilities of choosing all 
neighbourhoods, not just the chosen one17. That is one can write (4) as: 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1] = 𝛽
𝑛?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐 + 𝜆(𝑝𝑖1𝑡, … , 𝑝𝑖𝑁𝑡) (7) 
where are 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡 all the individual and area level characteristics for which we control, and 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 
is a binary variable taking the value 1 if individual 𝑖 is observed in neighbourhood 𝑛 at time 𝑡. 
The final term can be thought of as a more complicated version of the familiar sample selection 
correction term popularized by Heckman. Using (6), the propensity scores can be written in the 
following form:  
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗[𝛾
𝑛(?̂?1𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛𝑡), … , 𝛾
𝑛(?̂?𝑁𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛𝑡)] (8) 
The propensity scores have this form because only the differences in the values of amenities 
affect choices, while the individual characteristics cancel out. In our context, where the number 
of neighbourhoods that an individual might choose is very large, it is not feasible to estimate 
(7) and (8) in its general form. Our approach is to approximate the terms using a linear form. 
That is, we write (7) as:  
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1] = 𝛽
𝑛?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑗[𝛾
𝑛(?̂?1𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛𝑡)]𝑗≠𝑛 (9) 
where 𝜔𝑛𝑗 is the weight put on the relative amenity of neighbourhood j  in influencing the 
sample selection term for neighbourhood 𝑛 . It is natural to assume that more distant 
neighbourhoods have less influence and we assume that the weights have the form: 
𝜔𝑛𝑗 = 𝑒
−𝛼𝑑𝑛𝑗 (10) 
Where 𝑑𝑛𝑗  is the distance between the neighbourhoods and 𝛼 is a measure of the cost of 
distance. Using (10) in (9) leads to:  
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1] = 𝛽
𝑛?̂?𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑎(?̂?(∴𝑛)𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛𝑡) (11) 
Where: 
?̂?𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒
−𝛼𝑑𝑛𝑗
𝑗≠𝑛 ?̂?𝑗𝑡 (12) 
17 This might seem an arbitrary assumption but it is satisfied by all the most commonly used discrete choice models. See Das, Newey and 
Vella (2003) for details.  
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i.e. the sample selection correction term is a function of the difference between the chosen 
neighbourhood amenities and a weighted average of other neighbourhood amenities. The 
intuition behind (11) is that the sample selection issue can be absorbed by including a term that 
measures the difference in amenities between this neighbourhood and others that might have 
been included in the choice process. In implementing (12) we use a value α=1 though our 
results are not sensitive to this choice over plausible values. 
Equation (11) is not quite estimable because it includes the predicted values for the endogenous 
amenities. To estimate the model, we replace with the actual value of the amenities and 
instrument using the chosen instrument. For the own neighbourhood we use the own-
neighbourhood instrument and for the relative amenities we use the equivalent relative 
instrument. 
Instrumental variable 
The amenity that we are focusing on is a function of the ethnic mix of the neighbourhood. As 
an instrument for that we use a ‘Bartik’ style variable (Bartik, 1991). 
This type of instruments builds on the idea that, for historical reasons, area varies in terms of 
ethnic composition. Denote by 𝜇𝑔𝑛𝑡  the share of minority group 𝑔  in employment in 
neighbourhood 𝑛 in year 𝑡. The ethnic mix measures we use can all be written as a function of 
the current ethnic shares𝐼(𝜇1𝑛𝑡,, … , 𝜇𝐺𝑛𝑡) . Our instrument for the ethnic shares is constructed 
in the following way. Denote by 𝜇𝑔𝑛0 the share of minority group 𝑔 in neighbourhood 𝑛 in 
some base year. Denote by (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑡−1) the change in log population of minority 
group g  at time t . Then we define the predicted ethnic mix based on national population 
movements as:  
And we use as the instrument for the ethnic mix measure 𝐼(?̂?1𝑛𝑡,, … , ?̂?𝐺𝑛𝑡). Because we want 
the variation to come from the national population changes and not from the initial ethnic group 
shares we control for the latter in levels equations when we do not have neighbourhood fixed 
effects.  
?̂?𝑔𝑛𝑡 =
𝜇𝑔𝑛0(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑡−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑡−1)
∑ 𝜇𝑔′𝑛0(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔′𝑡−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑔′𝑡−1)𝑔′
(13) 
5. Results for Overall Satisfaction with Neighbourhood
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This section reports results for regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy taking 
value 1 for people answering Yes to the question Do you like your neighbourhood?. On average 
92.6% of people do. The variable we are interested in is the white share (our measure of 
diversity). To convey the robustness of the results we report a wide range of specifications: 
- With or without individual fixed effects, area fixed effects, individual*area fixed 
effects, and individual+area fixed effects 
- OLS and IV 
- With and without corrections for sample selection 
- In levels and differences  
These vary in the type of variation in diversity that is being used to estimate the effect on 
neighbourhood satisfaction. The results for the levels specifications are contained in Table 5 
and the differences specifications in Table 6. 
Levels 
The first column of the top panel (which we will refer to as specification 1A) shows the results 
for a model estimated by OLS and without any fixed effects or sample selection effects 
although it does contain individual characteristics and a variety of baseline neighbourhood 
characteristics, as well as time varying measures of local deprivation. This specification is the 
closest to those estimated in most of the literature on the impact of diversity on outcomes such 
as the ones we consider18. It uses variation in the white share across the neighbourhoods chosen 
by different individuals and variation over time in the white share of the same neighbourhood. 
There is a significant positive effect of the white share on neighbourhood satisfaction – a rise 
of 10 percentage points in the white share is estimated to raise neighbourhood satisfaction by 
1.2 percentage points. So column 1A suggests that diversity may be important. This is broadly 
consistent with the findings in Letki (2008) who includes neighbourhood satisfaction as one 
component of her ‘neighbourhood attitude’ index. 
However, it is possible that these effects cannot be interpreted as causal, as they may be biased 
for a number of reasons. It may be that the types of individuals who live in more diverse areas 
are different in some unobserved way that also affects neighbourhood satisfaction. A natural 
way to explore this hypothesis is to exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and include 
18 This is not to say there are no studies that attempts to deal with endogeneity issues – for example, see Leigh (2006) and Bjørnskov (2007) 
for papers using an IV approach in trust equations. 
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individual fixed effects – results when we do so are reported in column 2A of Table 5. One is 
now using variation in the white share for the same individual, both form changes within 
neighbourhoods and changes that result from residential mobility. The diversity variable 
remains significantly different from zero and the estimated effect is almost double that found 
in column 1A. This might be what one would expect e.g. individuals who are more tolerant of 
diversity might be found in more diverse areas.  
Column 3A reports results when neighbourhood 19  fixed effects are included. In this 
specification the impact of the white share is similar to that found in column 1A. In this 
specification one is exploiting variation in the white share within neighbourhoods over time 
but there might be correlations with individual characteristics. For this reason, we also compare 
results that include different fixed effects for each individual-area cell (Column 4A), i.e. a 
different fixed effect if an individual changes area. In this specification one is only using 
variation in the white share within neighbourhoods over time. The estimated impact of the 
white share is now similar to the individual fixed effect specification. Finally, column 5A 
includes both area and individual fixed effects – results are very close to the individual fixed 
effects ones. 
The use of fixed effects does not entirely rule out the possibility that our results are driven by 
some endogeneity bias. For this reason, we introduce an instrumental variable strategy i.e. we 
instrument the diversity with variables that one can argue are uncorrelated with unobserved 
neighbourhood characteristics. The IV estimates are in specifications 1B-5B that mirror the 
specifications 1A-5A. The first stages are reported in Table B3 in the Appendix. The 
Kleibergen-Papp test statistic is reported and the values suggest that the instruments are 
generally very strong. The estimated coefficients are very similar to the OLS estimates though 
the standard errors are larger and the coefficient estimate with area fixed effects only is not 
significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels (the instrument becomes 
weaker in this case as well though still very strong). Overall, the results seem quite robust. 
Even the IV estimates do not control for possible sample selection of individuals into areas and 
the right-hand panel of Table 5 presents estimates when a sample selection term is included 
along the lines of that suggested in the previous section – essentially a weighted average of the 
diversity variable in the surrounding neighbourhood. The coefficients on these sample selection 
19 In all text we use as a proxy for neighbourhood the Lower Super Output Area classification referred to 2001 Census of Population (ONS, 
2001). 
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terms are reported in Table B4 in the Appendix. When the sample selection term is included, 
the estimated coefficients are, for the most part, similar to those in the equivalent specification 
without sample selection terms. This is true for both OLS and IV estimates. However, the 
Kleibergen-Papp test statistics do suggest that the instruments become weak once area fixed 
effects are included, but one should also take into account that these are very demanding 
specifications – there are 2 endogenous variables once the sample selection term is included as 
well as a great number of fixed effects. 
Overall, Table 5 suggests a significant positive effect of the white share on neighbourhood 
satisfaction.  
First Differences 
Equation (2) can also be written in first-differenced form as: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽
𝑛Δ𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑐Δ𝑥𝑖𝑛(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡
𝑐 + Δ𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡  (14) 
where we have used the fact that the time-invariant exogenous neighbourhood amenities do not 
change over time and have changed notation slightly so that 𝑛(𝑖, 𝑡) represents the area in which 
individual i  lives at time t . Table 6 reports estimates for the model in this form, both OLS 
(Panel A) and IV (Panel B) without and with sample selection. First-differencing is an 
alternative way to eliminate individual fixed effects so we do not report specifications with 
them included. Column (1A) estimates the model by OLS and column (1B) by IV. The OLS 
results are in line with the results for ‘levels’ that an increase in the white share increases 
neighbourhood satisfaction (though the magnitude of the effect is larger in the differences 
specification) – in the IV specification the results are almost identical.  
In this specification the change in diversity comes from both within-area changes over time 
and changes as individuals move areas. The latter source of variation might be thought to be 
problematic because the residential mobility decision is clearly endogenous. So, one might 
consider estimating a model in which the change in diversity is measured for the original area. 
This could be interpreted as an ‘intention to treat’ (ITT) estimator as some individuals can 
avoid the “treatment” by moving to a different area. The result of this differenced estimator 
(which we call the FD fixed estimator) is reported in column (2A) for the OLS estimator and 
column (2B) for the IV estimator. The estimated coefficients are very different from the 
equivalent specifications in columns (1A) and (1B). Most strikingly, the coefficient on the 
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white share in the OLS specification becomes negative, though not significantly different from 
zero. 
Note that the ITT estimate does not measure how much people care about the amenities in their 
neighbourhood that is the main aim of our enquiry. Suppose that people did care but that 
residential mobility was so high and the range of neighbourhoods on offer so great that any 
change in the current neighbourhood that one disliked could be avoided by moving to another 
area. In this case the ITT estimate would be zero but it would be wrong to conclude people do 
not care about their neighbourhood – it would be more accurate to say that residential mobility 
insures them against any changes they do not like. If residential mobility itself is costly, one 
should not conclude that diversity is not an issue on the basis that the ITT estimate is zero. 
The difference between the FD and FD-fixed estimators is puzzling as only a small fraction of 
people moves – 6.7% on average - in any one year and, for those who do not, the change in the 
neighbourhood characteristics is identical in the two specifications. This suggests that the 
‘movers’ are rather different from the ‘stayers’. For those who never move, the share who like 
their neighbourhood is 0.94 while for those who do move, the share is 0.88 in the period before 
moving and 0.92 afterwards20, a very marked change. So the movers are likely to dominate the 
change in satisfaction with the neighbourhood. 
One way to investigate this puzzle is to write (14) in a more general form as: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽1
𝑛(𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑡 − 𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑡−1) + 𝛽2
𝑛(𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 − 𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑡) + 𝛽
𝑐Δ𝑥𝑖𝑛(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡
𝑐 + Δ𝑢𝑖𝑛(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 (15)
In (15) the first term in neighbourhood amenities is the change in characteristics for the 
neighbourhood where one was last year – this is the term used in the fixed area estimate. The 
second term is the difference in characteristics today between the area where one is now and 
the area where one was last year. For individuals who do not move both these changes in 
characteristics are the same but they are different for those who do move. 
Columns 3A and 3B present estimates of (15). Column 3A shows that both the white share in 
the current neighbourhood, and the between area difference in the white share are positive and 
strongly significant. This is interesting because the individuals are not experiencing the white 
share in that area. One could perhaps interpret it as individuals experiencing relief if they have 
moved away from an area that was becoming less white because they have avoided changes 
20 The most common reason that people who move point out is related to changing house (39%), followed by family-related reasons (22%), 
while reasons related to the neighbourhood are pointed out in the 10% of cases. 
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they would have been uncomfortable with. This explanation is speculative, but the results do 
suggest that neighbourhood satisfaction may not simply be driven by characteristics of the 
current neighbourhood. The results in column 3A can help explain the differences between the 
results in columns 1A and 2A. The results in column 3A imply that 𝑎𝑛(𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑡 has a negative 
impact on current individual satisfaction – this can then explain why the coefficient on the FD-
fixed difference is negative. 
Finally, we also consider first-difference specifications within individual*neighbourhood pairs 
i.e. using only within area changes for each individual – these are reported columns 4A (for 
OLS) and 4B (for IV). Moreover, in this case we find that a higher white share is associated 
with higher neighbourhood satisfaction. The right-hand panel of Table 6 presents estimates of 
fixed difference specifications with sample selection corrections. The first-difference 
specifications are similar though the instruments become weaker once sample selection is 
accounted for. 
Heterogeneity in Coefficients 
One obvious concern with the estimates presented so far is that they assume that all individuals 
are affected by neighbourhood characteristics in the same way i.e. the effects are homogeneous. 
First, it is quite possible that individuals prefer to be surrounded by their own ethnic group so 
that the coefficient on the white share would be different, possibly differently signed for whites 
and ethnic minorities. 89.9% of our sample is white so the estimates reported above will largely 
reflect their preferences but the preferences of minorities might well be different21. This has 
been explored by Becares et al (2011) who use data from the British Citizenship Survey that 
over-samples ethnic minorities to investigate the impact of diversity and deprivation on social 
cohesion.  
Other differences often discussed are that the old and the less educated may be less comfortable 
with diversity than the young, and the more highly educated, or that home ownership is 
important because it affects the ability to move areas and any impact on house prices might 
also be a consideration.  
Table 7 investigates possible heterogeneity introducing in the baseline specifications 
interactions of the diversity variable with individuals’ ethnicity, level of education, age, and 
21 BHPS does not over-sample minorities though UKHLS does. However, UKHLS is a small part of our sample. 
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home ownership status22. We present four sets of estimates, OLS and IV, with and without 
individual fixed effects. Across all four specifications graduates’ neighbourhood satisfaction is 
found to be less affected by the white share. For the non-whites, the estimates with and without 
fixed effects are different – without fixed effects, non-whites are less affected by the white 
share but with fixed effects they are more affected. There seem no significant variation by age. 
People who own a house seem to be more affected by diversity than private tenants once 
individual fixed effects are taken into account.  
Other Robustness Checks 
In an earlier section we discussed how it is hard to separately identify whether the right variable 
to measure diversity is the white share or the fractionalization index. So it is also possible that 
our results could really be picking up the impact of some other correlated measure of diversity. 
In the Appendix we explore this, presenting results for the ethnic fractionalization index (Table 
B5), the white share and the black share (Table B6), the white share and the Asian share (Table 
B7), the white share and the Pakistani/Bangladeshi share (to pick up the possible hostility 
towards Muslims) (Table B8) and the white share and the immigrant share (Table B9). An 
overall theme is that there is a robust significant impact of diversity on neighbourhood 
satisfaction but that the high degree of collinearity between different diversity measures means 
that one can be less sure about exactly which aspect of diversity is important. 
In the existing UK literature (Laurence and Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008; Andrews, 2009; 
Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Twigg, Taylor and Mohan, 2010; Laurence, 2011; Becares et al, 
2011; Sturgis et al, 2011; Demireva and Heath, 2014) on the impact of diversity on social 
capital, there is considerable discussion of the impact of deprivation. All our estimates control 
for the unemployment rate as a measure of deprivation. There is perhaps some independent 
interest in the impact of the unemployment rate on neighbourhood satisfaction (see also, Kling, 
Liebmann and Katz, 2007, and Ludwig et al, 2012 for the impact of neighbourhood poverty on 
various measures of well-being) and these results are reported in Appendix C. There is a 
significant impact of unemployment on neighbourhood satisfaction in some specifications but 
not all. Because one might also be concerned about the endogeneity of the unemployment rate, 
Appendix C also reports results when it is treated as endogenous. 
22 We also considered gender but this was never significant. 
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We have assumed that it is the LSOA that is the appropriate level of geographical aggregation 
for affecting neighbourhood satisfaction. We check this using two alternative methods. Firstly, 
we estimate the same model using Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) fixed effects instead of 
neighbourhood fixed effects (Table B10 in the Appendix), finding similar results. Secondly, 
we control for measures of diversity calculated both at the neighbourhood and at the TTWA 
level and we find that the effect of neighbourhood level diversity is essentially unaltered and 
is the most important factor (Table B11 in the Appendix). 
Because data on ethnic mix is only available at Census years we use interpolation for the 
intervening years. One might be concerned that this interpolation influences the results in some 
ways. But Table B12 in the Appendix shows that the results are very similar if we restrict 
attention to Census years. 
Summary 
Most of the specifications that we report suggest that an increase in the white share increases 
neighbourhood satisfaction. We find this in levels and differences, with and without individual 
fixed effects, allowing for endogeneity and sample selection. However, one should recognize 
that there are limits to how robust these conclusions are and we have tried to be open about that 
– when instrumental variables, area fixed effects and sample selection corrections are included
the instruments become weaker, the standard errors larger and the estimated coefficients not 
significantly different from zero. 
Most of the estimated coefficients are in the region 0.1-0.3 with perhaps a central estimate 
around 0.2. As the white share has fallen by about 10 percentage points in the period 1991-
2011 these estimates would imply that neighbourhood satisfaction has fallen by between 1 and 
3 percentage points over this period because of rising diversity. This effect is not enormous but 
the baseline probability is 92.6% so this is perhaps a sizeable rise in the fraction who are not 
satisfied with their neighbourhood. 
6. Residential Mobility
One potential criticism of the analysis so far is that response to the neighbourhood satisfaction 
question simply reflects people’s subjective response to which no significance can be attached. 
One way of addressing this is to consider whether responses to the neighbourhood satisfaction 
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question are correlated with intentions to move neighbourhood (itself subjective) and actual 
residential mobility23. 
In Table 8 we provide evidence that satisfaction with the neighbourhood has predictive power 
for the decision to move. The upper part of the table shows results for the actual moving. The 
dependent variable is, in fact, a dummy that takes value 1 if the person is observed in a different 
LSOA in time t with respect to time t-1. This is regressed on the lagged values of the 
neighbourhood satisfaction in columns (1) to (3). In all specifications, a higher satisfaction is 
associated with a lower probability of moving. The lower part of Table 8 shows that current 
neighbourhood satisfaction is also strongly correlated with the expression of an intention to 
move. Our conclusion is that responses to the neighbourhood satisfaction question are 
informative. 
7. Social Capital
Our analysis so far has focused on the impact of diversity on the level of satisfaction with the 
neighbourhood. While we would argue this is an outcome of interest as a summary measure of 
how well the neighbourhood ‘works’ for individuals, much of the literature on the impact of 
diversity on community focuses on two measures of ‘social capital’ – generalized trust and 
activity in organizations. This section considers these two outcomes. Unlike the neighbourhood 
satisfaction questions these are not asked every year so the sample sizes are much smaller 
particularly when one includes individual fixed effects as a sizeable proportion of the sample 
have only one response to this question. A number of prominent authors have suggested that 
diversity erodes generalized trust (e.g. Putnam, 2007), a view that has been the subject of 
considerable controversy (e.g. Uslaner, 2012; Gerritsen and Lubbers, 2010; Gesthuize, Van der 
Meer and Scheepers, 2009), with no settled conclusion to date (see the review by Nannestad, 
2008). 
Our method for controlling for sample selection into neighbourhoods has rarely found evidence 
that this is important in practice, perhaps unsurprising given the low rate of residential mobility. 
In the interests of brevity and clarity, the estimates that follow only report specifications 
without controls for sample selection – though our results are very similar if they are included. 
23 If there is, as seems likely, residential sorting, we have known since the work of Schelling (1971, 1972) that there is no presumption that 
the resulting equilibrium is efficient. There is no strong prediction on whether there is too little or too much segregation in equilibrium but a 
number of studies have documented the impact of segregation on wages, rental prices, and in general on economic performance (e.g. Cutler 
and Glaeser, 1997, Peri and Ottaviano, 2006; Ananat, 2011; Chetty et al, 2014). 
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Generalized Trust 
The responses to question on trust are widely used in the literature as a proxy for social capital. 
The upper panel of Table 9 presents results using generalised trust as the outcome variable. We 
find essentially no evidence that diversity affects the level of trust. A caveat is that the sample 
size is much smaller than that for the neighbourhood satisfaction equations because the trust 
question is asked less frequently. But it may be that generalised trust is not as closely linked to 
neighbourhood characteristics as commonly assumed, perhaps because the question asks about 
trust in people in general that may not be that tightly linked to the neighbourhood. 
Active in Organizations 
As an alternative measure of social capital we use a dummy variable taking value one for people 
who are active in at least one organisation - results are reported in the lower panel of Table 9. 
Also in this case, we find no significant impact of diversity on activity in organizations. 
8. Other Neighbourhood Outcomes
So far we have investigated the impact of diversity on neighbourhood satisfaction and 
residential mobility. While there is some impact on overall satisfaction we have not provided 
any evidence on the aspects of the neighbourhood that changes that influences overall 
satisfaction. This section investigates this. We consider possible impacts on the perception of 
crime, the quality of local services and the quality of one’s social life. 
Fear of Crime 
The questions asked about perceptions and fear of crime are listed in Table 1. For this section 
we only use the answers to whether the respondent worries about being a victim of crime 
because the sample size is largest for this question. The results are shown in Table 10 where 
the top panel reports OLS estimates with a variety of individual and area fixed effects and the 
bottom panel the equivalent specifications but using IV. The estimates suggest that a higher 
white share is generally associated with a significantly lower level of concern about crime.  
One should note that this is fear of crime and not actual crime and these may not be the same. 
For example, the literature on the link between migration and crime sometimes finds an impact 
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on fear of crime but little impact on actual crime once one controls for labour market status 
(that would be expected to affect crime incentives as argued by Becker, 1968)24.  
Quality of Local Services 
Table 11 does a similar exercise for the quality of local services index, which is the first 
principal component of the quality of local services variables in Table 1. One should note that 
the sample sizes for these outcomes is even smaller than for the fear of crime variable. The 
estimates with area fixed effects have very large standard errors. The estimates with no fixed 
effects or only individual fixed effects show that the coefficients on the white share are very 
different in OLS and IV specifications. Overall, the results for this outcome do not appear very 
robust. 
Quality of Social Life 
Table 12 does a similar exercise for the quality of social life index, which is the first principal 
component of the quality of social life variables in Table 1. All the estimated coefficients are 
positive suggesting that a high white share is associated with a higher quality of social life for 
our respondents. However, the standard errors are very large so that many of the estimated 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  
9. A Production Function for Neighbourhood Satisfaction
So far we have documented what we have argued are the causal effects of neighbourhood 
characteristics on various measures of feelings about neighbourhoods, from the high level 
overall satisfaction to different domains such as social capital, fear of crime, quality of local 
services and social life. One hypothesis is that feelings about specific domains go into 
producing an overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood. A simple linear production function 
for individual i ’s overall satisfaction 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑖, would be: 
𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑥𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (16) 
24 Bell and Machin, (2013), provide a broader literature review on the topic, here we report some of the most recent works on the argument. 
In the US, Chalfin (2014) finds no causal effect of Mexican migration on crime. Spenkuch (2014) finds that there is some small effect, 
concentrated on property and financial crimes, and for migrants with low labour market prospects. Moheling and Piehl (2009, 2014) find that 
prison commitment rates for new migrants is in general lower or equal to the natives’ one. Evidence from Europe has been targeted mostly in 
studying the EU enlargements during the 2000s (Bell, Fasani and Machin, 2013, Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti, 2012, Mastrobuoni and 
Pinotti, 2015) find modest effect of migration on property crimes only. Nunziata (2015) finds no effect on victimisation, but a significant 
impact on fear of crime. Sà (2015) finds that the negative effect of migration on house prices is not explained by any migration related increase 
in crime. 
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Where 𝑓𝑗𝑖 is the level of feeling about domain 𝑗 for individual 𝑖. What we have estimated are 
the impact of neighbourhood characteristics on these feelings i.e.:  
𝑓𝑗𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗
𝑐𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑗𝑖 (17) 
Substituting (17) into (16)implies that overall satisfaction can be written as: 
𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑖 = [∑ 𝛽𝑗𝛾𝑗𝑗 ]𝑎𝑖 + [𝛽
𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝛾𝑗
𝑐
𝑗 ]𝑥𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑗 (18) 
which is what we have also estimated. What is not identified in this estimates are the factor 
loadings – the 𝛽𝑗  - on different domains in (16). These are however of some interest e.g. 
whether it is crime or social interactions that is the main transmission channel from 
neighbourhood characteristics to overall satisfaction. Ideally one would estimate (16) 
instrumenting the different domains using the first-stages implied by (17). However, this 
approach only works if we have at least as many instruments as domains and there is 
independent variation in the domains.  
In the absence of our ability to do that, we report estimates of (16) by OLS. These estimates 
cannot be given a causal interpretation but we do think they are of some interest. Results that 
include factors25 for the different groups of variables are reported in Table 1326. Columns (1), 
(3) and (5) report estimates of neighbourhood satisfaction on the various domain i.e. (16). 
Neighbourhood satisfaction is, as one might expect, positively related to social capital, quality 
of local services and social life and negatively related to the fear of crime though the importance 
of social capital does not survive the introduction of individual fixed effects suggesting it may 
not vary much over the life-course. The relation with deprivation is negative, but significant 
only when individual fixed effects are considered. Our earlier results would suggest that the 
impact of diversity is not through the social capital variables that has been the focus of much 
of the literature but through fear of crime, the quality of services and social life. Columns (2), 
(4) and (6) include both the diversity variables and the domain satisfaction measures showing 
that the white share has explanatory power: this suggests that we have not identified all the 
channels through which diversity affects satisfaction with the neighbourhood. 
25 Factors are obtained grouping single variables with Principal Component Analysis techniques.
26 Table B13 in the Appendix reports results obtained including all variables. In both cases, as there is no year for which all questions are 
asked, information is pooled for the two closest years in which information is available. 
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10. Conclusion
Our estimates suggest that people do care about the characteristics of their neighbours. While 
people may care about the nature of their neighbours, they cannot control who they are. My 
presence in an area may have some externalities on my neighbours, and my decision to move 
is not something they can control. This combination of caring about something but being unable 
to control it is the classic recipe for stress so it is not surprising that changing communities stir 
up strong emotions and reactions. Understanding these is critical to making communities thrive. 
This paper has investigated how diversity affects various measures of satisfaction with 
neighbourhood, seeking more causal estimates of the impacts than is found in most of the 
existing literature. Our main conclusions are that there is evidence of some effect of diversity 
on both overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood and specific aspects like fear of crime and, 
less clearly, the quality of social life. However, we do not find any significant association with 
the most commonly used measures of social capital such as generalized trust and membership 
of organizations. Although our results are suggestive, they are not definitive. The results are 
not always as robust as one would like and there is undoubtedly considerable room for further 
research about what determines the level of neighbourhood satisfaction and how that can be 
mediated, a topic on which this paper remains silent. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for values and attitude variables in the British Household Panel 
and in Understanding Society. 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Satisfaction: 
Like your present neighbourhood .926 .262 244,276 
Plan to stay in your neighbourhood .690 .463 102,012 
Actual mobility .067 .250 428,516 
Social capital: 
Generally speaking, most people can be trusted .368 .482 102,584 
Active in at least one organisation .585 .493 164,493 
Member of at least one organisation .530 .499 164,716 
Willing to improve your neighbourhood .760 .427 102,115 
Crime: 
Worry you're being victim of crime .478 .500 76,264 
Feel unsafe walking alone at night .182 .386 76,229 
Likely home broken into .236 .425 33,480 
Likely car stolen/broken into .078 .269 33,482 
Likely drunks/tramps on the street .149 .356 34,082 
Likely graffiti on the walls .232 .422 34,152 
Likely people being attacked on the street .084 .278 34,302 
Likely racial insults/attacks .056 .230 33,405 
Likely teenagers hanging about .568 .495 34,114 
Likely vandalism .263 .440 34,130 
Quality of local services: 
Good schools .699 .459 61,387 
Good medical services .706 .456 73,782 
Good transportation .500 .500 70,804 
Good shopping facilities .577 .494 75,323 
Good leisure facilities .441 .497 71,382 
Suitable for children .656 .475 32,953 
Social life: 
Meet your neighbours often .773 .419 147,400 
Friends in the local neighbourhood .613 .487 102,377 
Can obtain advice locally .553 .496 102,176 
Can you borrow from people in the neighbourhood .440 .496 102,039 
Feel similar to people in the neighbourhood .605 .489 102,149 
Talk to people in your neighbourhood .694 .460 102,441 
Satisfied with social life .656 .475 141,769 
Notes: All variables are dummies constructed upon affirmative replies to the corresponding questions. Table B1 reports the waves where 
each variable appears. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for individual-level control variables for the British Household 
Panel and Understanding Society sample. 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Age  46.42 18.46 14 104 
Female  0.539 0.498 0 1 
Unemployed  0.045 0.208 0 1 
Retired 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Full-time student 0.007 0.085 0 1 
Other non working 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Married  0.532 0.499 0 1 
Number of children 0.511 0.929 0 10 
Non-white  0.097 0.297 0 1 
Higher education  0.279 0.449 0 1 
Low education 0.291 0.454 0 1 
No education 0.132 0.339 0 1 
Social house tenant 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Private tenant 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Notes: Excluded dummies for each set – working, high school education, and home owners, for labour force status, education and house 
status, respectively – are not reported. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for main area-level variables. 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Britain overall 
White share 0.918 0.143 0.007 1 
Ethnic mix 0.128 0.181 0 0.870 
Immigrant mix 0.132 0.135 0 0.681 
Black share 0.020 0.051 0 0.637 
Immigrant share 0.080 0.102 0 0.939 
Asian share 0.048 0.101 0 0.997 
Muslim share 0.029 0.075 0 0.953 
Unemployment rate 0.039 0.035 0 0.986 
Area (Ha) 568 2,740 0.73 115,963 
Country of birth mix in 1971 (area level) 0.057 0.073 0 0.629 
Age below 16 in 1991 0.200 0.035 0.053 0.406 
Age above 65 in 1991 0.10 0.049 0.014 0.593 
House owners in 1991 0.642 0.197 0.012 0.987 
Social housing in 1991 0.229 0.162 0 0.938 
Urban areas in 1991 0.111 0.314 0 1 
BHPS and US sample 
White share 0.896 0.179 0.004 1 
Ethnic mix 0.152 0.207 0 0.872 
Immigrant mix 0.152 0.148 0 0.683 
Black share 0.023 0.057 0 0.617 
Immigrant share 0.094 0.118 0 0.757 
Asian share 0.059 0.128 0 0.962 
Muslim share 0.026 0.086 0 0.952 
Unemployment rate 0.037 0.029 0 0.708 
Area (Ha) 599 2,152 1.24 77,870 
Country of birth mix in 1971 (area level) 0.055 0.073 0 0.629 
Age below 16 in 1991 0.201 0.036 0.053 0.372 
Age above 65 in 1991 0.162 0.049 0.014 0.593 
House owners in 1991 0.657 0.188 0.012 0.987 
Social housing in 1991 0.224 0.160 0 0.987 
Urban areas in 1991 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Notes: Area-level information refers to the Lower Super Output Area codification related to the 2001 census. Britain overall panel displays 
descriptives for all English, Welsh, and Scottish LSOAs in the non-ipolated years only. BHPS and US sample panel displays results for the 
subset of LSOAs that appears in the British Household Panel and in Understanding Society. Se Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
Muslim share is proxied by the share of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people in the area. 
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Table 4: Correlations. 
Ethnic mix 
index 
Migrant mix 
index 
White 
share 
Black 
share 
Immigrant 
share 
Asian 
share 
Muslim 
share 
Ethnic mix index 1 
Immigrant mix 
index 
0.853* 1 
White share -0.958* -0.809* 1 
Black share 0.771* 0.653* -0.727* 1 
Immigrant share 0.847* 0.977* -0.839* 0.658* 1 
Asian share 0.800* 0.641* -0.900* 0.382* 0.683* 1 
Muslim share 0.728* 0.597* -0.832* 0.420* 0.633* 0.870* 1 
Notes: * p < 0.01. Correlations are estimated for the universe of the 40,880 UK LSOAs, for the years for which census data are available, 
namely 1991, 2001, and 2011. Se Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
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Table 5: The impact of ethnic mix on how you like your neighbourhood.  
 No sample selection Sample selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
                                                                                                            A. OLS 
White share 0.123*** 0.224*** 0.112** 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.122*** 0.241*** 0.116** 0.274*** 0.282*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.020) (0.041) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
           
                                                                                                             B. IV 
White share 0.084*** 0.225*** 0.105 0.356*** 0.346*** 0.086*** 0.220*** 0.131* 0.327*** 0.337*** 
 (0.023) (0.048) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082) (0.022) (0.049) (0.074) (0.081) (0.076) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP 1.3e+04 3526.216 424.199 996.240 1016.209 780.445 179.746 2.403 4.640 4.391 
           
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS is the baseline specification not including any individual or area Fixed Effects. Standard errors account for clusters at the individual level 
in OLS, Individual FE, and Area+Individual FE specifications. Standard errors account for clusters at the area level for Area FE, and for clusters ate the area-individual level in the Area*Individual FE specifications.  
Area FE specifications include Lower Super Output area Fixed Effects, Area*Individual FE include LSOA-individual level fixed effects, and Area+Individual FE include both LSOA and individual fixed effects, taken 
as separate FE sets. Panel B shows Instrumental Variable estimates. Right-hand panels include controls for sample selection, as illustrated by equation (13), with α equal to 1. IV-Sample Selection specifications use 
instrumental variables for both the share of white people and for the corresponding sample selection variable. Sample selection coefficients are reported in Table B3 of the Appendix. All regressions include individual, 
area-level controls, and year dummy variables. Se Appendix A for a description of the control variables and of the variables of interest. KP is the Kleibergen-Paap weak instrument statistic.  
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Table 6: The impact of ethnic mix on how you like your neighbourhood. First difference results. 
 No Sample Selection Sample Selection 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FD FD fixed  
Full FD 
decomposition 
FD within 
area*individual 
FD 
FD 
fixed  
Full FD 
decomposition 
FD within 
area*individual 
                     A. OLS 
White share (difference) 0.419*** -0.121 0.184*** 0.465*** 0.446*** -0.132 0.172* 0.462*** 
 (0.046) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.051) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096) 
White share: between areas difference   0.394***    0.436***  
   (0.047)    (0.057)  
         
N 170,042 170,057 170,042 155,788 170,042 170,057 170,042 155,778 
         
                                                 B. IV 
White share (difference) 0.412*** -0.247 0.463*** 1.141 *** 0.439*** -0.236 0.462***  1.118*** 
 (0.055) (0.167) (0.161) (0.181) (0.062) (0.086) (0.159) (0.192) 
White share: between areas difference   0.371***    0.398***  
   (0.056)    (0.062)  
         
N 168,572 168,631 168,572 154,528 168,572 168,631 168,572 154,528 
KP  3758.990 1889.531 926.808 1635.509 134.215 8.422 4.015 7.549 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. In each regression the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the respondent states to like 
the neighbourhood in which he/she lives. See Appendix A for a description of the control variables and of the variables of interest. See Section 4 for a discussion of the various First Difference Specifications, Instrumental 
Variables, and controls for sample selection. KP is the Kleibergen-Paap weak instrument statistic.  
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of results. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Do you 
like your neighbourhood?  
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No FE Individual FE No FE Individual FE 
   
White share 0.191*** 0.179*** 0.135*** 0.199*** 
 (0.024) (0.048) (0.026) (0.057) 
White share *NonWhite -0.080*** 0.056 -0.060*** 0.255*** 
 (0.015) (0.058) (0.017) (0.071) 
White share *Higher Education -0.095*** -0.188*** -0.123*** -0.293*** 
 (0.015) (0.045) (0.016) (0.052) 
White share*Low Education -0.056*** 0.092 -0.049*** -0.094 
 (0.016) (0.061) (0.017) (0.080) 
White share*No Education -0.062*** 0.047 -0.041* 0.145* 
 (0.021) (0.065) (0.022) (0.082) 
White share *Age50 -0.011 0.018 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.0114) (0.029) (0.015) (0.032) 
White share *Home Owner 0.014 0.069** 0.024 0.087*** 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.018) (0.035) 
White share*Social Tenant -0.013 0.045 -0.013 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.049) (0.022) (0.052) 
     
N 228,636 199,353 228,636 199,353 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. Please refer to Notes of Table 5 
for references about different specifications, and to Appendix A for full control variables description. 
  
38 
 
Table 8: Actual moving and propensity to stay in the area. Linear probability models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A No FE Individual FE Area FE FD (lagged) 
Dependent variable: Actual moving  
          
Like your neighbourhood (lagged) -0.084*** -0.110*** -0.089*** -0.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
     
N 198,431 174,328 193,914 
 
145,757 
 (1) (2) (3)  
B No FE Individual FE Area FE  
 Dependent variable: Propensity to stay 
     
Like your neighbourhood 0.487*** 0.357*** 0.405***  
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.010)  
     
N 61,316 33,129 56,654  
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Actual moving is a dummy that takes value 1 if the respondent is 
observed in 2 different LSOAs from one year to the other. Propensity to stay is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent states 
that he/she is willing to stay in the area. See Notes of Table 5. 
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Table 9: Trust and activity in organisations. 
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
 Dependent variable: Generalised trust 
White share 0.016 0.018 -0.078 -0.039 -0.069 -0.063* 0.134* 0.097 0.144 0.120 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.112) (0.122) (0.128) (0.032) (0.075) (0.189) (0.210) (0.220) 
           
N 90,799 64,394 86,672 58,849 62,961 90,799 64,394 86,672 58,849 62,961 
KP      1.1e+04 1536.050 451.487 1057.199 961.337 
           
                                           Dependent variable: Active in any organisation 
White share -0.023 -0.045 -0.065 -0.054 -0.053 -0.036 -0.015 0.095 0.133 0.106 
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.068) (0.078) (0.079) (0.028) (0.062) (0.105) (0.133) (0.134) 
           
N 148,651 120,258 144,562 111,814 118,342 148,651 120,258 144,562 111,814 118,342 
KP      1.9e+04 3640.095 442.256 917.578 906.409 
           
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 5. 
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Table 10: Fear of Crime. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Are you worried of 
being victim of a crime? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
 OLS 
White share -0.120*** -0.104 -0.390*** -0.324** -0.321** 
 (0.024) (0.076) (0.114) (0.136) (0.147) 
      
N 65,162 34,799 60,501 28,070 32,778 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
 IV 
White share -0.139*** -0.228** -1.029*** -1.404*** -1.374*** 
 (0.032) (0.112) (0.191) (0.236) (0.255) 
      
N 65,162 34,799 60,501 28,070 32,778 
KP 1.3e+04 1541.112 697.085 1126.676 964.205 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 5. 
 
Table 11: Quality of services in the area. Dependent variable: Quality of services in the 
area index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
                     OLS 
White share -0.159 0.023 -0.149 -0.836* -0.841 
 (0.126) (0.278) (0.477) (0.468) (0.521) 
      
N 21,942 15,012 20,253 11,738 13,307 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
                    IV 
White share -0.269* 0.208 -0.526 -0.602 -0.663 
 (0.159) (0.426) (0.692) (0.697) (0.776) 
      
N 21,942 15,012 20,253 11,738 13,307 
KP 4049.557 742.314 294.616 673.939 541.340 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 5. 
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Table 12: Quality of social life. Dependent variable: Quality of social life index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
                OLS 
White share 0.351*** 0.300 0.403 0.802*** 0.791** 
 (0.108) (0.212) (0.388) (0.328) (0.361) 
      
N 31,157 24,538 29,643 18,770 22,430 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No FE Individual FE Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area FE 
                 IV 
White share 0.401*** 0.294 0.424 0.830* 0.835 
 (0.140) (0.300) (0.561) (0.495) (0.545) 
      
N 31,157 24,538 29,643 18,770 22,430 
KP 3782.681 1265.654 438.880 1210.790 996.177 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 5. 
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Table 13. Satisfaction production function. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Do you like your neighbourhood?  
 No FE Individual FE Area FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
White share  0.109***  0.327***  0.056 
  (0.023)  (0.105)  (0.121) 
Social capital 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.003 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Crime -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Quality of local services 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Social life  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 20,143 20,118 13,273 13,256 18,359 18,331 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications) in parentheses. The full set of variables is not available for all years. The sample is therefore pooled to aggregate information 
for closest subsequent years for which information is available. See Appendix A for a description of the main variables and Table B2 in the Appendix for a description of the Principal Component Analysis used to 
construct the variables Social Capital, Crime, Quality of local services, and Social life. 
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Appendix  
A –Variables description 
All area level variables refer to the Lower Super Output Areas (LSOA) level. Data for inter 
census years have been derived from LSOA level linear ipolation. 
 
Other diversity variables 
- Ethnic mix index of ethnic fractionalisation calculated following Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2000) 
𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑀𝑖𝑥 = 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑎
2
𝑖
 
 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑎 is the share of people in each ethnic group 𝑖 in the population area 𝑎. The 
ethnic group considered are White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other 
Asian, Black Carribean, Black African, Other Black, and Other Ethnic groups. 
Source: Census of population 1991-2011. 
- Migrant mix index of country of birth fractionalisation calculated in the same way 
as the Ethnic mix, over the share of people born in UK, Europe, Africa, India, 
Pakistan, and other countries. Source: Census of population 1991-2011. 
- Immigrant share people born outside UK over the total population. Source: Census 
of population 1991-2011. 
- White share, Asian share, Black share, and Muslim share (we proxy the Muslim 
share with the share of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people in the area as religion is 
not available for all censuses considered). Source: Census of population 1991-2011. 
Control variables 
All regressions control for the following individual level characteristics from BHPS and 
Understanding Society 
Individual level characteristics 
- Age 
- Gender dummy 
- Level of education (Dummy variables: Higher Education – Primary – No education. 
Excluded category: Secondary education) 
- Working status (Dummy variables: Unemployed - Retired – Full time student – Out 
of the labour force for other reasons, Excluded category: Working) 
- Ethnicity (Dummy: Non-white vs White) 
- Marital status (Dummy: Married vs Not married) 
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- Number of children 
- House ownership status (Dummy variables: Private tenant, Social house tenant. 
Excluded category: Home owner) 
Time invariant LSOA level characteristics. Source: Census of population 
- Government Office Regions dummies 
- 1971 migrant mix 
- 1991 share of people employed in each 1-digit SIC industry 
- 1991 age structure – percentage of people aged less than 16 and more than 65 
- 1991 proportions of house owners and of households living in council houses 
- Dummy for urban areas in 1991 
- Logarithm of the size of the LSOA (hectares) 
Time-variant LSOA level characteristics  
- Rate of unemployment - average monthly number of people claiming for 
unemployment related benefits as a share of the working age population. Source: 
Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) 1991-2014. 
- Index of Multiple Deprivation – it combines information on different domains – 
income, employment, education, skills and training, health and disability, barriers 
to housing and services, living environment – at the Lower-layer Super Output Area. 
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government for England, Welsh 
Government National Statistics for Wales, and Scottish Government National 
Statistics for Scotland 
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B – Additional Tables 
Table B1: Values and attitude questions in the British Household Panel (B) and in 
Understanding Society (U). 
Variable  Waves 
Satisfaction:  
Like your present neighbourhood B: all - U: 3  
Plan to stay in your neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Social capital:  
Generally speaking, most people can be trusted B: 8, 10, 13, 15, 17 - U: 1  
Active in at least one organisation B: 1-5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 – U: 3 
Member of at least one organisation B: 1-5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 – U: 3 
Willing to improve your neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Crime:  
Worry you're being victim of crime B: 7, 12, 17 - U: 3 
Feel unsafe walking alone at night B: 7, 12, 17 - U: 3 
Likely home broken into B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely car stolen/broken into B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely drunks/tramps on the street B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely graffiti on the walls  B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely people being attacked on the street  B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely racial insults/attacks  B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely teenagers hanging about B: 7, 12, 17 
Likely vandalism B: 7, 12, 17 
Quality of local services:  
Good schools B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Good medical services  B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Good transportation B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Good shopping facilities  B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Good leisure facilities  B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Suitable for children B: 8, 13, 18 
Social life:  
Meet your neighbours often B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Friends in the local neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Can obtain advice locally B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Can you borrow from people in the neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Feel similar to people in the neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Talk to people in your neighbourhood B: 8, 13, 18 - U: 3 
Satisfied with social life B: 6-10, 12-18 
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Table B2. Correlations between indices and Principal Component Analysis. 
Panel A. Correlation matrix  
 Social 
capital 
Crime Quality of local services Social life 
     
Social capital 1    
Crime -0.108* 1   
Quality of local services 0.116* -0.184* 1  
Social life and neighbourhood 0.151* -0.072* 0.206* 1 
     
Notes: * p < 0.01. 
Panel B. Principal Components Analysis - Eigenvalues 
 Social 
capital 
Crime Quality of local 
services 
Social life and 
Neighbourhood 
     
1st Component 1.682 3.443 2.033 2.685 
2nd Component 1.002 1.073 1.211 0.988 
3rd Component 0.914 0.969 0.887 0.864 
4th Component 0.402 0.838 0.702 0.813 
5th Component - 0.765 0.595 0.634 
6th Component - 0.667 0.572 0.549 
7th Component - 0.641 - 0.467 
8th Component - 0.570 - - 
9th Component - 0.563 - - 
10th Component - 0.472 - - 
Panel C. Principal Components Analysis – 1st Principal Components  
Social Capital  Crime  
Generally speaking, most people can 
be trusted 
.276 Worry you're being victim of crime 
.154 
Active in at least one organisation .658 Feel unsafe walking alone at night .224 
Member of at least one organisation .666 Likely home broken into .351 
Willing to improve your 
neighbourhood 
.219 Likely car stolen/broken into 
.331 
  Likely drunks/tramps on the street .331 
  Likely graffiti on the walls  .345 
  Likely people being attacked on the street  .351 
  Likely racial insults/attacks  .309 
  Likely teenagers hanging about .292 
  Likely vandalism .402 
Quality of local services  Social life and Neighbourhood Crime 
Good schools .412 Meet your neighbours often .341 
Good medical services  .450 Friends in the local neighbourhood .465 
Good transportation .356 Can obtain advice locally .441 
Good shopping facilities  .427 Can you borrow from people in the 
neighbourhood 
.354 
Good leisure facilities  .433 Feel similar to people in the neighbourhood .369 
Suitable for children .362 Talk to people in your neighbourhood .446 
  Satisfied with social life .113 
Notes: There is no year in which all questions have been asked, therefore, for this table, information is kept only for adjacent waves that 
maximize the number of variables observed, namely for waves 7 and 8, 12 and 13, and 17 and 18 of the BHPS. 
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Table B3. Main results, first stage regressions. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer 
to Do you like your neighbourhood?  
Panel A: No sample selection 
   
Dependent variables Specification White share 
White share No FE 0.981*** (.009) 
 Individual FE 0.899*** (.015) 
 Area FE 1.226*** (.060) 
 Area*Individual FE 1.225*** (.039) 
 Area+Individual FE 1.218*** (.038) 
Panel B: Sample selection 
  Instrumental Variable First Stage Coefficients 
   
Dependent variable  White share Sample selection: White 
share 
White share  No FE 1.067*** (.008) -0.282*** (.014) 
 Individual FE 1.007*** (.017) -0.289*** (.030) 
 Area FE 1.408*** (.059) -1.255*** (.164) 
 Area*Individual FE 1.412*** (.040) -1.386*** (.099) 
 Area+Individual FE 1.411*** (.039) -1.387*** (.099) 
Sample selection:    
White share  No FE 0.013 (.008) 0.573*** (.018) 
 Individual FE -0.023 (.018) 0.558*** (.037) 
 Area FE 0.021  (.041) 0.266**  (.234) 
 Area*Individual FE 0.001 (.028) 0.250*** (.081) 
 Area+Individual FE -0.001 (.028) 0.236*** (.079) 
    
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table B3 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, 
and clusters. 
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Table B4. Main results, levels. Coefficients of sample selection control variables. 
Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Do you like your neighbourhood?  
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
Sample selection: 
White share -0.083** -0.154** -0.064 -0.246*** -0.272*** -0.028 -0.237 0.117 1.657 1.068 
 (0.037) (0.063) (0.084) (0.087) (0.087) (0.108) (0.151) (1.154) (1.615) (1.504) 
           
N 225,688 200,497 221,471 192,451 198,839 225,688 200,497 221,471 192,451 198,839 
           
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. See Notes for Table 5.  
 
 
Table B5. The impact on the ethnic mix fractionalisation index on how you like your neighbourhood  
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual* Area 
FE 
Individual+ Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
 No sample selection 
Fractionalisation  -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.016** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.027*** -0.020 -0.056*** -0.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.044) (0.045) (0.013) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP      1.7e+04 6319.330 455.241 1116.179 1150.846 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
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Table B6. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Black share control variable 
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* Area 
FE 
Individual+ Area 
FE 
 No sample selection 
White share 0.093*** 0.118*** 0.011 0.082 0.068 0.092*** 0.156** 0.242 0.512* 0.400 
 (0.019) (0.043) (0.068) (0.070) (0.709) (0.026) (0.061) (0.244) (0.263) (0.253) 
Black share -0.171*** -0.480*** -0.548** -0.641** -0.764*** 0.048 -0.231 0.776 0.827 0.298 
 (0.052) (0.120) (0.254) (0.279) (0.274) (0.062) (0.155) (1.258) (1.292) (1.236) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP      2753.834 1335.770 5.642 9.750 10.609 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
 
Table B7. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Asian share control variable  
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual* Area 
FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* Area 
FE 
Individual+ Area 
FE 
 No sample selection 
White share 0.179*** 0.349*** 0.312*** 0.443*** 0.483*** -0.025 0.178* 0.079 0.217 0.321 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.102) (0.109) (0.108) (0.044) (0.099) (0.309) (0.342) (0.337) 
Asian share 0.077* 0.205** 0.339** 0.407** 0.472*** -0.149*** -0.045 -0.036 -0.253 -0.041 
 (0.041) (0.091) (0.157) (0.167) (0.167) (0.055) (0.161) (0.534) (0.603) (0.593) 
           
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP      1578.601 752.657 21.847 45.827 47.403 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
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Table B8. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Muslim share control variable  
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
 No sample selection 
White share 0.150*** 0.234*** 0.174*** 0.286*** 0.301*** 0.087*** 0.157*** 0.064 0.268** 0.315** 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.027) (0.058) (0.123) (0.135) (0.133) 
Muslim share 0.068* 0.056 0.207 0.283* 0.330** 0.012 -0.153 -0.132 -0.357 -0.116 
 (0.036) (0.083) (0.163) (0.163) (0.162) (0.045) (0.128) (0.407) (0.537) (0.526) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP      3523.271 502.735 12.745 24.081 25.214 
           
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
 
Table B9. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Immigrant share control variable  
 OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
 No sample selection 
           
White share 0.215*** 0.295*** 0.133** 0.075 0.101 0.278*** 0.458*** 0.354 2.174 1.273 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.035) (0.083) (0.834) (1.679) (1.535) 
Foreigners share 0.189*** 0.150** 0.030 -0.181** -0.146* 0.385*** 0.450*** 0.219 1.546 0.787 
 (0.035) (0.058) (0.073) (0.081) (0.080) (0.054) (0.105) (0.713) (1.419) (1.295) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP      4161.402 749.246 4.995 4.941 5.258 
                     
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
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Table B10. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Travel to Work Area Fixed effects. 
 No sample selection Sample selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TTWA FE 
Individual* 
TTWA FE 
Individual+TTWA FE TTWA FE Individual*TTWA FE Individual+TTWA FE 
                                                      A. OLS 
White share 0.108** 0.235*** 0.202*** 0.110*** 0.281*** 0.223*** 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.034) (0.021) (0.046) (0.042) 
       
N 224,361 197,712 199,311 224,361 197,712 199,311 
       
                                                      B. IV 
White share 0.065*** 0.283*** 0.203*** 0.060*** 0.289*** 0.201*** 
 (0.024) (0.055) (0.049) (0.015) (0.060) (0.051) 
 
   
   
N 224,361 197,712 199,311 224,361 197,712 199,311 
KP 563.763 2257.511 3310.845 33.635 85.984 155.886 
       
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table B11. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Controls for Travel to Work Area variables and fixed effects 
 No sample selection Sample selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
TTWA FE 
Individual* 
TTWA FE 
Individual+ 
TTWA FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
TTWA 
FE 
Individual* 
TTWA FE 
Individual+ 
TTWA FE 
                                                         A. OLS 
White share 0.102*** 0.204*** 0.120** 0.231*** 0.208*** 0.097*** 0.227*** 0.119*** 0.297*** 0.254*** 
 (0.018) (0.038) (0.029) (0.042) (0.038) (0.023) (0.050) (0.028) (0.059) (0.051) 
White share 
TTWA level 0.030 0.032 -0.162*** 0.013 -0.044 0.034 0.014 -0.161** -0.049 -0.078 
 (0.025) (0.050) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.027) (0.056) (0.066) (0.074) (0.070) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 224,361 197,712 199,311 224,362 199,312 224,361 197,712 199,311 
           
                                                        B. IV 
White share 0.051** 0.187*** 0.072*** 0.275*** 0.184* 0.052** 0.179*** 0.071*** 0.282*** 0.200*** 
 (0.025) (0.054) (0.027) (0.064) (0.151) (0.025) (0.059) (0.019) (0.075) (0.060) 
White share 
TTWA level 0.059** 0.067 -0.139** 0.026 0.081 0.059** 0.074 -0.138** 0.019 -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.059) (0.062) (0.087) (0.140) (0.029) (0.064) (0.056) (0.094) (0.084) 
           
N 224,362 199,312 224,361 197,712 199,311 224,362 199,312 224,361 197,712 199,311 
KP 5612.847 1498.096 290.875 912.301 165.694 474.356 109.597 22.446 54.126 99.753 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table B12. The impact of diversity on how you like your neighbourhood. Census years only 
 No sample selection Sample selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual*Area 
FE 
Individual+Area 
FE 
                                                           A. OLS 
White share 0.083*** 0.141*** 0.074 0.119* 0.105 0.079*** 0.115* 0.031 0.120 0.111 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.067) (0.072) (0.080) (0.017) (0.060) (0.071) (0.076) (0.084) 
           
N 54,791 21,045 50,029 13,525 18,327 54,791 21,045 50,029 13,525 18,327 
           
                                                             B. IV 
White share 0.035* 0.199*** -0.023 0.102 0.082 0.040** 0.172*** 0.039 0.073 0.073 
 (0.019) (0.082) (0.090) (0.109) (0.120) (0.010) (0.079) (0.101) (0.102) (0.111) 
           
N 54,791 21,045 50,029 13,525 18,327 54,791 21,045 50,029 13,525 18,327 
KP 1.5e+04 1201.846 369.928 605.281 502.618 464.350 46.277 3.514 4.989 4.502 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A and notes of Table 5 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, and clusters. 
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Table B13. Satisfaction production function.  
Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Do you like your neighbourhood?  
  
 No Fixed Effects Individual FE Area FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
White share  0.064**  0.304***  0.060 
  (0.025)  (0.101)  (0.119) 
Social capital       
General trust 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003 0.003 0.007** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Active in any organisation -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Member of any organisation 0.008** 0.008** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Willing to improve your neighbourhood 0.011** 0.011** 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Crime       
Worry being victim of a crime 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Worry alone at night -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Likely home broken into -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.010 -0.011 -0.013** -0.013** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Likely car stolen -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
Likely drunk/trumps -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.016* -0.016* 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Likely graffiti -0.011** -0.010* -0.018** -0.018** -0.007 -0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Likely people being assaulted -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.015 -0.013 -0.029** -0.028** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) 
Likely racial insults -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.034* -0.032 -0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) 
Likely teens hanging about -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Likely vandalism -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
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Table B13 (cont’ed). Satisfaction production function.  
Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to Do you like your neighbourhood?  
 
 
No Fixed Effects Individual FE Area FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Quality of local services       
Good schools 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Good medical services 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Good transports 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Good shopping facilities 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Good leisure facilities -0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Good children facilities 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Social life       
Meet Neigh. Often -0.002 -0.003 0.015* 0.014* 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Have friends in the neighb. 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Can have advice in the neighb. 0.011*** 0.011** 0.007 0.006 0.011** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Can borrow from neighbours -0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Feel similar to neighbourhood 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Talk to neighbours 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.012 0.011 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Satisfied with social life 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.004 0.003 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Observations 20,143 20,118 13,273 13,256 18,393 18,365 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table B3 for notes on control variables, variables of interest, 
and clusters. 
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C – Endogenous deprivation 
A large amount of discussion in the UK context has been focusing on how deprivation affects 
various aspects of social life and in particular social cohesion (Laurence and Heath, 2008; Letki, 
2008; Andrews, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Twigg et al, 2010; Laurence, 2011; Becares 
et al, 2011; Sturgis et al, 2011; Demireva and Heath, 2014). One concern may be that 
deprivation can partly capture the effect that we attribute to diversity, and that our estimates 
could actually be partly biased. Our approach throughout the paper is to control for two 
measures of deprivation, the unemployment rate (source: Nomis) and the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (source: ONS). 
Because of the interest these variables have attracted Table C1 shows the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate for the regressions reported in Table 5. In specifications without fixed 
effects or only individual fixed effects there is a significant negative effect of unemployment 
on neighbourhood satisfaction. But it is not as robust as the estimated effect of the white share. 
One might be concerned about the exogeneity of the unemployment rate so we try to go a bit 
further and to consider unemployment as an additional endogenous factor.  
As we do for diversity, we pursue two approaches; one relies on instrumental variables and the 
other attempts at controlling for the location bias. For the latter we mimic what illustrated in 
Section 4, Sample Selection paragraph, and therefore we add as a control a weighted average 
of the unemployment rate (u) constructed as follows 
?̂?1(∙𝑛)𝑡 ≡ ∑ 𝑒
−𝛼𝑑𝑛𝑗
𝑗≠𝑛
?̂?𝑗𝑡 
where njd  is the distance between the neighbourhoods and 𝛼is a measure of the cost of distance
– that we set equal to 1 for simplicity, although trying with different cost values does not change
the results. 
The instrumental variable that we use is, as for diversity, a Bartik style instrument (Bartik, 
1991), which exploits the fact that, due to historical reasons, areas differ in the industrial mix 
of local employment. Being 𝜙𝑠𝑛  the share working age people employed in sector 𝑠  i in 
neighbourhood 𝑛 in some base year, and (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡−1) the change in log employment 
in the sector at time 𝑡, the change in demand given is then: 
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Δ𝐶𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝜙𝑠𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡−1)
𝑠
 
This instrument is best targeted at capturing changes in the unemployment rate as it represents 
the change in the demand index. In other words it is well-suited when the model is estimated 
in first-differences. One could write the level of the of the demand as: 
𝐶𝑛𝑡 = 𝐶𝑛0 + ∑ 𝜙𝑠𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑡−1)
𝑠
 
for some base-year measure of local demand, 0nC . If there are neighbourhood fixed effects
then the initial level gets absorbed into that effect. If there are not then one needs to control for 
variables that measure the initial level of demand and we use the initial industry shares. The 
results when both the white share and unemployment are treated as endogenous are reported in 
Table C2. They are very similar to those reported in Table C1 though the IV results are 
considerably noisier. 
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Table C1: The impact of ethnic mix and unemployment on how you like your neighbourhood. White share as only endogenous variable 
No sample selection Sample selection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
     A. OLS 
White share 0.123*** 0.224*** 0.112** 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.122*** 0.241*** 0.116** 0.274*** 0.282*** 
(0.017) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.020) (0.041) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
Unemployment rate -0.104*** -0.109*** 0.012 0.028 -0.006 -0.104*** -0.108*** 0.012 0.029 -0.005 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) 
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
 B. IV 
White share 0.084*** 0.225*** 0.105 0.356*** 0.346*** 0.086*** 0.220*** 0.131* 0.327*** 0.337*** 
(0.023) (0.048) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082) (0.022) (0.049) (0.074) (0.081) (0.076) 
Unemployment rate -0.108*** -0.109*** 0.012 0.020 -0.012 -0.108*** -0.109*** 0.025 -0.001 -0.018 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044) 
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP 1.3e+04 3526.216 424.199 996.240 1016.209 780.445 179.746 2.403 4.640 4.391 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Notes of Table 5 and Appendix A for further details
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Table C2: The impact of ethnic mix and unemployment on how you like your neighbourhood. White share and unemployment rate as 
endogenous variables. 
No sample selection Sample selection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
No FE 
Individual 
FE 
Area 
FE 
Individual* 
Area FE 
Individual+ 
Area FE 
     A. OLS 
White share 0.123*** 0.224*** 0.112** 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.124*** 0.239*** 0.116** 0.273*** 0.282*** 
(0.017) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.020) (0.041) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
Unemployment rate -0.104** -0.109*** 0.012 0.028 -0.006 -0.066 -0.150** 0.002 0.075 0.025 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) (0.061) (0.064) (0.074) (0.061) (0.061) 
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
      B. IV 
White share 0.060* 0.182*** 0.223 0.583*** 0.523*** 0.071 0.279*** 0.119 0.448** 0.356** 
(0.035) (0.060) (0.149) (0.156) (0.152) (0.063) (0.084) (0.170) (0.183) (0.178) 
Unemployment rate -1.681 -4.217 -1.008 -1.943* -1.548 -1.747 -3.518 0.459 -0.589 0.305 
(1.680) (2.969) (1.091) (1.099) (1.071) (1.997) (3.783) (1.632) (1.627) (1.589) 
N 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 224,362 199,312 220,144 191,413 197,618 
KP 13.908 4.269 4.995 17.316 17.873 7.109 1.814 1.961 6.366 6.088 
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Notes of Table 5 and Appendix A for further details 
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